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Richard Wellesley and the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War
By Ryan Campbell
The British Empire in India was the final result of decades of expansion by the East
India Company. The East India Company had been actively trading in the East Indies since
the granting of its charter at the beginning of the seventeenth century. 1 Starting with the
battle of Plassey in 1757, and followed by the defeat of the Marathas in 1818, the East India
Company became the dominant power in the Indian subcontinent. The supremacy of the
Company lasted until the Great Mutiny in 1857, and it was during its aftermath the
Company lost control. During the initial phase of this period, famous individuals such as
Robert Clive and Warren Hastings led the conquest of Bengal. 2 The person who is largely
credited with expanding upon the initial gains of Clive and Hastings is Richard Wellesley.
These gains included the Eastern Ghats, The Malabar Coast, and Rohilkhand. 3
In addition to annexations by the East India Company, Wellesley also oversaw the
initiation of many subsidiary alliances with local powers. The subsidiary alliance was “a
satisfactory means of gaining control over the internal affairs of allied states, without being
officially responsible for them.” 4 Regions that Wellesley brought under control through
this system include, Travancore, Hyderabad, Oudh, and Mysore. 5 Wellesley was
Governor-General of the Presidency of Fort William in Calcutta from May 18, 1798, to
July 30, 1805. One scholar even described Wellesley as “the first of the governor generals
to have an imperial vision.” 6 During this time Wellesley enjoyed “power (that) was equal
to that of a Roman Proconsul.” 7 Throughout his tenure, Wellesley expanded Company
territory in order to defend it from foreign and domestic enemies. It is the purpose of this
study to prove that Richard Wellesley utilized the French threat in India to engage in an
offensive war motivated by geopolitics against Tipu Sultan, which culminated in the Siege
of Seringapatam.
The chief foreign adversary in India and globally for the British was France. This
phase of the Anglo-French rivalry dated back to the late seventeenth century, and grew
with intensity throughout the eighteenth century. 8 In the Seven’s Years War (1756-1763),
Britain scored decisive victories over the French in North America and India. 9 The AngloEast India Company, The Register of Letters & C of the Governour and Company of Merchants of London
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French rivalry flared up again and led to conflict with the outbreak of The French
Revolutionary Wars 1782-1802, and the advent of Napoleon Bonaparte. As a result of this
rivalry, France continued to seek out Indian allies to fight against the East India Company.
The Fourth Anglo-Mysore War combined both the foreign and domestic threats to
British control in India. This was the final confrontation between the British East India
Company and the Kingdom of Mysore, ruled by Tipu Sultan. Tipu ascended to the throne
of Mysore in 1782 after the death of his father Hyder Ali. 10 In the 1750s Hyder had become
the de facto ruler of Mysore through his military acumen, and pushed aside the Wodeyar
family during the chaos of the Mysore-Maratha Wars. 11 During the course of Tipu’s rule
1782-1799, the Kingdom of Mysore became the biggest obstacle to British control of South
India. Only eight years into his rule Tipu invaded Travancore, which led to the Third
Anglo-Mysore War. The Third Anglo-Mysore War lasted from 1790-1792; this resulted
in a resounding defeat for Mysore, but the British failed to seize his capital Seringapatam.
The Fourth Anglo-Mysore War 1798-1799, however, ended with a second and successful
siege of Seringapatam on April 5 – May 4, 1799, and the death of Tipu. 12 The foreign threat
was French aid promised to the Kingdom of Mysore 13 in the shape of the Malartic
Proclamation issued by the French Commander of the Isle-de-France, Anne Joseph
Hyypolyte de Maures Comte De Malartic, on January 1798. 14 This proclamation stated
that Tipu desired to make an alliance with the French in order to drive the British out of
India. Furthermore, it stated that Tipu would finance the war, and that he was only waiting
for the French in order to declare war against the British. It also called for volunteer
citizens, since the French army stationed there was stretched thin. 15 It was after thirty-two
years of intermittent warfare between Mysore and the British East India Company, that this
obstacle would be removed.
But scholars have not always agreed as to what were Richard Wellesley’s
motivations were for the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War. Some have argued that Wellesley was
motivated by economic factors. P.J. Marshall has argued that the East India Company was
a “military-fiscal state.” 16 This meant that the expansion of Company territory was caught
in a perpetual cycle, because every increase in territory required a larger military and
administrative force. Which in turn required further conquests to fund the increase in
personal. 17 While others have stressed that Wellesley was motivated by geopolitical
factors. C.A. Bayly has argued that for the British in India, “internal tranquility could only
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be guaranteed by absolute paramountcy in the sub-continent.” 18 This meant the
neutralization of the French threat and Mughal successor states in India.
Scholars have also argued over the nature of the war, whether the war was fought
in either an offensive or defensive manner. Lawrence James argued that Wellesley was
looking for “an excuse to invade Mysore.” 19 On the other hand Jac Weller has portrayed
Wellesley as defensive, and Tipu as the aggressor. 20 This work will first analyze the
insufficient theories of economic and defensive motivations for the conflict in question.
Secondly it will explore why the theories of geopolitical and offensive motivations are
more accurate to explain why Wellesley’s war against Mysore. Third, it will explore how
the reactions to the Siege of Seringapatam demonstrated the early nineteenth-century
British attitudes towards empire. This period showed an embracement of the growing
Empire, which was focused on peace and prosperity. However, the only way to ensure the
safety of the Empire was through military conquest.
***
Perhaps the most important of evidence to support the economic theory was Tipu’s
agenda as ruler. Tipu sought to develop “state management of commercial factories and
banking establishments.” 21 This policy of economic control was seen in many of the
Mughal successor states, such as Awadh, Bengal, Hyderabad, and Mysore. These local
regimes “sought to monoplise and protect trade, settle wandering groups and disperse
armies, to re-establish the power to tax the countryside.” 22 Tipu had also injured Company
trade by establishing an embargo, cutting the British out of Mysore. 23 These economic
practices are why the East India Company labeled Tipu as a “frivolous and capricious
innovator; the mean and minute economist; the peddling trader; and even the retail shopkeeper.” 24 The “frivolous and capricious innovator” labels are referencing his changes in
Mysore, to make it a stronger state. While the “peddling trader” and “retail shopkeeper”
are referencing the embargo enacted against the British. While it is true that conquering
Mysore would result in the British being able to trade in the region, there is insufficient
evidence to indicate that this was Wellesley’s main motivation.
Furthermore Wellesley’s wars were devastating for the finances of the East India
Company. 25 Wellesley did increase the potential revenue of the East India Company by
£15 million, but he also dramatically increased its debts. 26 “Notwithstanding the despatch
(sic) of nearly six millions sterling to Wellesley, the Indian debt between 1799 and 1807
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increased from about £10,000,000 to over £26,000,000.” 27 This accounting has led to
Wellesley being characterized as a “man bent on militaristic adventures”, whose
governorship was a series of “military excursions…made without any regard to cost”. 28 As
a result the economic motivation is at its best, is seen as a secondary motivation when
compared to the geopolitical motivations.
Third, the most significant factor in determining Wellesley’s motivations in India
are the geopolitical factors. The primary geopolitical factor that influenced Wellesley was
the French menace, which he was able to use against another geopolitical threat Tipu
Sultan. Wellesley reached India in 1798 in the middle of the French Revolutionary Wars.
That same year in 1798 when Wellesley arrived in India, Napoleon invaded Egypt with the
goals of acquiring grain for France, and disrupting British trade in the East. 29 Some scholars
have even argued that Napoleon dreamed of marching on either Constantinople or India
and joining forces with Tipu Sultan.30 The invasion of Egypt and the Malartic Proclamation
gave Wellesley the perfect opportunity to go to war with Tipu. There was the precedent of
opposing France regardless of the cost. A prime example can be found in Wellesley’s
predecessor Lord Cornwallis actions in 1785.
Cornwallis had been instructed to follow the Act of 1784, which was a neutrality
act in the case of conflict between any of the powers in India. This act was tested just a
year later when war broke out between Tipu Sultan and the Maratha Empire. The Board of
Control advised Cornwallis that, “if any European power, in particular France, took one
side in the war, the Company was automatically to take the other.” 31
Furthermore, the suspicion that the French were planning to invade India can be found
in a series of letters between Wellesley and William Eden. In a reply to one such letter
Wellesley explained:
On October 18, we learnt the destination of the Toulon fleet and army to be
towards India. Although I certainly did not expect that the French would
attempt the route by Egypt, I have been convinced for a long time that their
views were turned this way, and accordingly (thank God) I took my
precautions as early as the month of June. We can now defy them 32
This excerpt it telling because it shows two things that Wellesley thought in regards to the
French. First, Wellesley said that he “did not expect” the French to attack India via Egypt.
This phrase leads one to believe that Wellesley would have dismissed any French attack
from Egypt as improbable. Second, Wellesley said that he was “convinced that their views
were turned this way”. This statement shows that Wellesley did not think that France would
attack India directly from Egypt. Instead Wellesley was more concerned about France
meddling in relations with Mysore and Hyderabad This is a prime example of Wellesley at
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the very least having down played the French threat. Further on in the letter Wellesley
asked Eden:
I trust you will be of opinion that the blow which I have struck at Hyderabad
was not unseasonable. It took place on October 22; and the intelligence reached
me nearly at the same moment with the glorious news of the victory at Aboukir.
Our accounts of the state of Bonaparte’s army leave little doubt of its final
destruction. 33
This portion of the letter covers Wellesley’s effort to have the French forces removed from
Hyderabad. The “blow which I have struck at Hyderabad” was to force the nizam to dispel
the French troops there. 34 This effectively removed French influence from the kingdom
and also ensured that they would come to the Company’s aid in the war against Mysore.
Furthermore Wellesley referenced Horatio Nelson’s victory at the Battle of the Nile
(Aboukir). Nelson’s victory effectively ended France’s ambitions of using Egypt as a base
from which they could launch a seaborne invasion of India. 35 These two events resulted in
the hindrance of France’s ability to interfere in India.
These two statements show that Wellesley acknowledged that the French threat in
India was in a state of decline. Despite the lack of France’s capability to support the
Malartic Proclamation, Wellesley was still preparing the Company to go to war against
Tipu. At first glance, Wellesley’s actions appeared to have contradicted his correspondence
with Eden. In fact they revealed Wellesley’s true intentions, that regardless of France’s
capacity to aid Tipu, he was going to war against him. This proves that Wellesley overemphasized the French threat in India in order to have a justification for war against Tipu.
Ultimately the geopolitical situation was the biggest factor that led to the capture
of Seringapatam. The proposed alliance between the French Republic and the Kingdom of
Mysore ended up having the opposite effect for both parties. It did very little for the French
in their geopolitical aims; at the best, it kept British troops busy in India. For Tipu it proved
a death sentence. On the contrary, it was a boon for Richard Wellesley and the East India
Company their aims. Wellesley was able to use the half-hearted promises of support from
the French as an excuse to go to war with Mysore. Or in other words the threat of a FrancoMysore alliance was a “godsend, for it gave him [Wellesley] an excuse to invade Mysore
and deal once for and all with a persistent and dangerous adversary [Mysore].” 36 Prior to
the Malartic Proclamation and the French Invasion of Egypt, the East India Company was
reluctant to expand more. Wellesley used these developments as “lever” for him to pressure
the Company to allow him to launch a preemptive strike against a “revival of French
influence.” 37
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Furthermore, by leading an expansion of British power, one might argue that
Wellesley was motivated by a potential increase in revenue that new territories would
bring. But claiming that Wellesley was driven strictly by economic factors has been
described by C.A. Bayly as “simple-minded economism.” Bayly describes Wellesley’s
reasoning for expansion as wanting to “create in India a great counter weight to France in
Europe. They were concerned that what the British already held in revenue and trade was
at risk from further ‘tribal breakout’ of Afghan under Zaman Shah Durrani or, worse, from
the revival of Maratha power within India.” 38 All of the aforementioned evidence leads one
to doubt the validity of the economic theory behind Wellesley’s motivation for the Fourth
Anglo-Mysore War. If Wellesley were motivated by annexing new lands in order to collect
revenue, then why would he more than double the debt of the Company? The economic
need for the annexation of Mysore is “difficult to establish.” 39 “In the India of militaristic
belief and crumbling Mogul polities,” Philip Lawson explains, “Wellesley was provided
with the ripest opportunity to achieve his ends” 40
While Wellesley’s actions make Tipu Sultan appear to be the victim in this game
of geopolitics between two European empires, he was not completely innocent. In addition
to being viewed as a usurper by the British, Tipu was seen as a major threat to British rule
in India. Tipu was indicated as being “their (the British East India Company’s) most
dangerous single enemy in India and the most likely to be active in future.” 41 This fear of
Tipu was not unfounded; in fact he had attacked an East India Company ally before
Wellesley’s tenure as governor. In 1790, after receiving encouragement from the French
government Tipu Sultan attacked Travancore beginning the Third Anglo-Mysore War. At
the outset of the war the Company enjoyed initial success, until supply problems and Tipu
forced the British commander Charles Cornwallis to retreat from Seringapatam. 42 Tipu
would not be able to replicate this success in his last war with the East India Company.
Second, the theory that Wellesley fought this war in a defensive manner is worth
exploring. The best example of the Wellesley’s defensive posture is found in his answer to
the Malartic Proclamation. Wellesley first learned about the infamous Malartic
Proclamation on June 8 1798, after seeing that it was published in a Calcutta newspaper. 43
At first Wellesley doubted its authenticity but when he received two copies of the
proclamation he took it seriously. 44 The first copy came from Lord Macartney at the Cape
of Good Hope. Macartney obtained that copy from an American sailing vessel, which was
ironically named the Sultan. 45
Wellesley then wrote to Tipu, “being anxious to afford you every proof in my power of
my sincere wish to maintain the good understanding which had so long subsisted between
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your Highness and the Company…” 46 This correspondence may appear to show Wellesley
attempting to placate Tipu, but in fact it was a façade. The reason that Wellesley wrote to
Tipu in such a cordial manner was to “buy time” from him in order to gather material for
the war. Wellesley had initially wanted to go to war to neutralize the threat posed form
Mysore as soon as possible, but was unable due to numerous factors. On July 6 1798
Wellesley wrote to Lord Dundas the Secretary of State for War, that he was calling off the
attack because he “lacked of the necessary funds, because monsoon in the south would
make the roads impassable, and because neither the nizam [of Hyderabad] nor peswha
[Maratha] would provide any assistance.” 47 Edward Ingram maintains that “throughout
1798 and 1799 Wellesley had to write as if Tipu Sultan was about to attack the British: in
fact the British were about to attack him.” The source of this strategy was the board of
directors in Madras. They believed that although Tipu was antagonistic towards the British,
his policies would always be defensive. The board also believed that he would only attack
if they made their preparations “too obviously offensive.” 48
Wellesley also wanted support from the Kingdom of Hyderabad and the Maratha
empire. 49. This support included getting the Kingdom of Hyderabad to disband the French
units that were stationed there. 50 This move served the dual purpose of weakening the
French influence in Southern India and denying Mysore a potential ally. The kingdom of
Hyderabad and the Maratha Empire both aided the British East India Company and
Wellesley in the Fourth Mysore War. This was due to the Treaty of Yadgir signed in 1784,
which promised that Hyderabad and the Marathas would not go to war against one another.
The two powers met again in 1790 and agreed to aid the British in future wars against
Tipu. 51
Therefore, what is perceived at first glance as a defensive posture taken by
Wellesley was in fact an act of deception. Wellesley had to prepare the finances and gather
troops and allies in order to wage a successful war. Dundas praised Wellesley in a private
letter on March 18, 1799 that his decision to delay attacking Tipu until the proper resources
were allocated allowed the Company forces to “enable you (Wellesley) to act with effect,
if the humility of acknowledgements is not adequate to what our power, and the justice of
our cause, entitle us to demand” 52 If he was going to destroy the last obstacle to British
control of Southern India, he had to make sure that he had the army and resources for it.
Fourth, the aggressive manner in which Wellesley pursued and carried out the war
is seen in the tenacity Wellesley demonstrated throughout his correspondences. For
example, in a series of letters to Henry Dundas, Wellesley portrayed his aggressive
motives. Dundas on the other hand expressed a general reluctance to go to war; he simply
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wanted to defend British interests. 53 One can trace Wellesley’s determined effort to
convince Dundas to allow him to go to war in a letter written on February 23, 1798, three
months before he learned of the Malartic Proclamation. 54 Wellesley detailed the growing
military strength of Hyderabad with an attachment of a survey taken by Lt. Col. William
Kirkpatrick that showed
“The actual strength, but the original part of the nizam’s military
establishment, its rapid increase, the consequences to be expected from its
continuance or further growth, as well as the means which either had been or
might be suggested for averting any danger which those consequences might
threaten to our interests in India.” 55
Although Hyderabad was a Company ally, Wellesley still used it as an example to claim
that the British position in India was under threat. This was a clever strategy on Wellesley’s
part, because what better way to cause Dundas to become unsettled over the British
possessions in India, than to portray their own allies as being superior in strength?
Dundas’ reluctance to go to war was untenable after he became aware of the Malartic
Proclamation; in fact, on June 16, 1798 Dundas wrote in a private letter to Wellesley “the
intelligence we have received from the Cape must have reached you either from the
Mauritius itself or from the Cape of Good Hope, long before you can receive this.” So,
Dundas assumed that Wellesley already was aware of the Malartic Proclamation, but incase
Wellesley were not, Dundas provided a copy to him. Dundas also assumed that “we (British
East India Company) are probably by this time at war with Tipu Sultan.” 56 Although
Dundas was reluctant to become engaged in open warfare with Tipu, he has acquiesced to
it. This was due to the Malartic Proclamation. Dundas’ tone and attitude toward the war
would change again in another note to Wellesley.
Dundas wrote to Wellesley and gave him a different command just three days later,
on June 19, 1798: “If Tipu has made preparations of a hostile nature, or if the proclamation
of Tipu inviting the French was his own, do not wait for actual hostilities on his
part…attack him!” 57 This evidence supports the notion that Wellesley was encouraged to
act aggressively in India. In fact Lord Dundas directed the annexation of parts of Mysore
territory in order to connect the British territories in India. 58 The land that was desired the
most was the Malabar Coast, by annexing this Mysore would be landlocked, and Company
possessions would be contiguous. 59 This aggressive strategy was not limited to the Indian
subcontinent and included other territories in the East Indies including Dutch possessions
of Java, Batavia, and Surinam. 60 This action is in line with Dundas’ strategy prior to the
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Malartic Proclamation, which was to take European colonies in order “to deprive them
of their colonial possessions”. 61
There is also another piece of evidence proving Wellesley’s aggressive strategy
towards Tipu. The article in question is a letter that came from the Sultan of the Ottoman
Empire, Selim III. It is worth noting that this letter was written prior to the invasion of
Mysore. Selim wrote the following to Tipu in order to offer advice that also happened to
be influenced by Ottoman geopolitics:
We make it our special requested that your Majesty will please to refrain from
entering into any measures against the English, or lending any compliant ear
to the French…we wish the connection above alluded to be exchanged in
favour of Great Britain. 62
In this letter Selim advised Tipu to relinquish the hope that the French would come to his
aid. Interestingly this letter represents an about-face of Franco-Ottoman diplomacy, where
for centuries prior to the French invasion of Egypt the two countries enjoyed an alliance. 63
Napoleon’s invasion of Ottoman Egypt caused Selim to declare war on France in
retaliation. 64 Selim has urged Tipu to “befriend” France’s oldest enemy, Great Britain.
Napoleon’s invasion also resulted in the Ottomans signing alliances with the Russian
Empire on January 9, 1799 and Great Britain on January 11, 1799. 65
Wellesley received this letter from the British minister in Istanbul, Spencer Smith.
This occasion was not the first time that a document from the Sultan reached Tipu. When
the Ottoman Empire declared war on the French in retaliation for their invasion of Egypt,
the declaration was also sent to Tipu. 66 Wellesley forwarded this letter to Tipu. Tipu
responded to Selim’s advice in a letter to Wellesley dated on 13 February 1799. Tipu
thanked Wellesley for forwarding the letter to him, but declined to meet Selim’s wishes.67
It is worth noting the date that Tipu responded to Selim, which was February 9, 1799.
Wellesley had already ordered General Harris to invade Mysore two days before on
February 11, 1799. 68 This leads to the conclusion that regardless of Tipu’s response to
Selim the invasion was going to occur one way or the other.
***
The British reaction to the Siege of Seringapatam demonstrated changing attitudes
towards the empire. This period showed an acceptance and celebration of the growing
Empire. This Empire was centered on peace and prosperity, which was provided through
military strength. This was evident in the positive reaction The Court of Directors issued
on September 24, 1799:
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Resolved unanimously that the thanks of this Court be given to the Earl of
Mornington, Governor General, for the able and successful measures which he
adopted, whereby the complete annihilation of French influence at the Court
of Hyderabad was happily accomplished, for the ability, firmness and decision
manifested by His Lordship in his conduct towards the late Tippoo Sultan, and
for the previous measures which he pursued for enabling the army to take the
field, whereby it was put in a situation to act with vigor against the enemy, and
to effect the speedy conquest of the capital of the Mysore dominions, the happy
presage of a lasting peace in India, and consequent increase of prosperity to the
East India Company69
This appreciative reaction would be repeated two months later on December 24, 1799. 70
This overwhelming positive reaction by the East India Company supports the idea that the
Company valued Wellesley’s actions in Mysore. Though the Company was initially
reticent about the escalation of conflict and costs in India, seen in the tenuous strategy of
neutrality in 1784, this changed due to French influence in Mysore. As soon as French
influence was rumored in Mysore, both Tipu Sultan and his kingdom’s independence were
on borrowed time.
The reaction that Parliament issued on October 4, 1799, to the capture of
Seringapatam is similar in tone to the one issued by the East India Company. Though there
are some differences in the Parliamentary response in regard to the content. The House of
Lords can see these differences in the following proclamation:
Resolved, nemine dissentiente (no one dissenting, unanimously), by the Lords
Spiritual and Temporal in Parliament assembled that the thanks of this House
be given to the Right Honorable Richard Lord Wellesley, Earl of Mornington
in the kingdom of Ireland, and Governor General of India, for the wisdom,
decision and energy with which is discharged the arduous duties of his station,
from the time of his taking upon him the said Government to the glorious
termination of the late war by the capture of Seringapatam; during which
period, by opposing to the perfidy of the late Sultaun(sic) of Mysore a uniform
moderation, dignity and firmness, and by counteracting with equal promptitude
and ability the dangerous intrigues and projects of the French, particularly by
destroying their power and influence in the Decan(sic), he prepared the way
for the rapid and brilliant operations carried on under his superintendance(sic)
and direction, the result of which has finally disappointed all the designs of our
enemies in that quarter, and has established, on a basis of permanent security,
the tranquillity(sic) and prosperity of the British Empire in India. 71
This proclamation was repeated in the House of Commons with only minor changes in
word usage. 72 In addition to the lofty praise from the Company and Parliament, Wellesley
was awarded a pension of “£5,000 a year, granted for twenty years-a return for

P.C. Gupta, Fort William-India House Correspondence and Other Contemporary Papers Relating
Thereto, Volume XIII: 1796-1800 (Delhi: Civil Lines, 1959), 131.
70
Ibid, 28.
71
Ibid, 132-133.
72
Ibid, 134-135
69

Mornington’s having declined to take his share of the prize-money collected at
Seringapatam.” 73
These declarations of appreciation are worth analyzing because they reveal much
about British attitudes toward their growing Empire. This shows the view that Wellesley
and the British had of Tipu Sultan, that he was a treacherous enemy. In regards to the
French, they are not viewed very highly either. The French activity in India is described as
being a state of “dangerous intrigues. Now these “dangerous intrigues” most likely refer to
the half-hearted overtures from the French to Tipu Sultan, or the call in the Isle-de-France
calling for volunteers to fight for Tipu Sultan. Both of these entities threatened the peace
and prosperity of the Empire in India. So, in order to deny France an Indian ally that could
challenge Company rule, the imperial conquest of Mysore was deemed the necessary
response to both dangers.
The conquest of Mysore is indicative of the predicament that the East India
Company found itself in at the end of the eighteenth century. The Company was stuck in a
position in India that in order to defend its territory, it had to wage war against the Mughal
successor states. The Company would then either annex the state, or make its rulers sign a
subsidiary alliance. This was done in order to maintain the peace and prosperity of British
India. In other words, “only formal rule could provide stability for the Indian Empire.”74
This problem plagued the Company until the mid-nineteenth century.
Furthermore, it is worth noting the irony in the last part of the statement that
Wellesley’s actions “established, on a basis of permanent security, the tranquility and
prosperity of the British Empire in India. Following the Fourth Anglo-Mysore War, the
East India Company would be in an almost constant state of warfare until the Great Mutiny
in 1857. This era of conflict includes the following wars: The Second Anglo-Maratha War
1803-1805, The Third Anglo-Maratha War 1817-1818, 75 The First Burma War 1824-1826,
The First Afghan War 1839-1842, The Conquest of Sind 1843, Defeat of Gwalior 1844,
The First Sikh War 1845-1846, The Second Sikh War 1848-1849, The Second Burma War
1852, Nagpur Annexed 1853, Oudh Annexed 1856. 76
The reaction to the capture of Seringapatam was not limited to 1799. During a debate
in parliament in 1800, Prime Minister William Pitt the Younger delivered an address
discussing the French threat. This commentary traced the growth of French power in
Europe and the extension of that power outside of the Europe and how it spread to Egypt.
An excerpt of Pitt’s address is provided below:
The only plea which they have since held out to colour this atrocious invasion
of a neutral and friendly territory, is, that it was the road to attack the English
power in India. It is most unquestionably true, that this was one and a principal
cause of this unparalleled outrage: but another, and an equally substantial cause
(as appears by their own statements), was the division and partition of the
territories of what they thought a falling power. It is impossible to dismiss this
subject without observing that this attack against Egypt was accompanied by an
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attack upon the British possessions in India, made on true revolutionary
principles. In Europe, the propagation of the principles of France had uniformly
prepared the way for the progress of its arms. To India, the lovers of peace had
sent the messengers of Jacobinism, for the purpose of inculcating war in those
distant regions, on Jacobin principles, and of forming Jacobin clubs, which they
actually succeeded in establishing, and which in most respects resembled the
European model, but which were distinguished by this peculiarity, that they were
required to swear in one breath, hatred to tyranny, the love of liberty, and the
destruction of all kings and sovereigns – except the good and faithful ally of the
French relic Citzen Tippoo. 77
Pitt’s speech not only traced the growth of French power, it revealed the British view of
Tipu. Tipu represented in Pitt’s opinion, the monstrous combination of enemies for late
eighteenth-early nineteenth century Britain. The first enemy was the “Jacobin principles”
that France had brought to Mysore. Proof of the Jacobin presence in Mysore was found in
reports that Tipu wore a liberty cap, and even referred to himself as “Citizen Tipu.” 78 It is
worth noting that the Jacobin threat was eliminated with the closing of the Jacobin Clubs
in France in 1794. 79 Furthermore, Pitt referred to Tipu as a “relic”. Use of the word relic
showed that Pitt viewed him as one of the last vestiges of India prior to the British rise to
power. Pitt combined the defeated Jacobin ideology with the tyrannical Tipu to show that
the new power in India was the East India Company.
Furthermore, the change in the attitude toward empire is best observed when one
looks at the treatment that previous Company administrators received upon their return to
Great Britain. The previous Company leaders, Robert Clive and Warren Hastings, were
both criticized for expanding Company territory. Clive was subject to hearings conducted
against him by Parliament from 1772-1773, during which he was attacked for money he
received in India. Clive was never fully charged for any offenses, and died shortly after his
exoneration on November 22, 1774. 80 Hastings faced an impeachment trial throughout the
1780’s and early 1790’s, due having been accused of corruption. 81
Edmund Burke was one parliamentarian who argued in favor of the impeachment
of Hastings. Burke charged Hastings with “villany” which included the “wasting of the
country and destruction of the land” 82 Burke indicated to his colleagues in parliament that
the East India Company received a portion of its power through its charter from the British
government. It also derived another portion from the Mughals via the diwani rights of
Bengal. 83 Burke interpreted that as a consequence of accepting the diwani rights “Great
Britain made a virtual act of union with that country, by which they bound themselves as
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securities for their subjects, to preserve the people in all rights.” 84 Burke charged Hastings
with abusing that power, but maintained that they were responsible to “the high justice of
the kingdom.” 85 Burke continued to argue on that it was the duty of the British to “teach
men that they are to confirm their practices to principles.” 86 In other words, it was the duty
of the British Empire to spread the rule of law to its subjects. Burke carried on with the
impeachment in the name of the Commons of Great Britain, “whose parliamentary trust he
betrayed”, and in the name of the Indian people. 87
Fortunately for Hastings he would be acquitted of all charges on April 24, 1795.
Despite Hastings being found innocent, Burke’s testimony was indicative of the critical
view that eighteenth century Britain had towards Empire building. Burked considered
Hastings’s activities in India to have demonstrated “arbitrary power.” 88 Burke also
considered empire building philosophically to be wrong. Towards the end of his indictment
of Hastings, Burke stated that “it is not to be had by conquest; for by conquest, which is a
more immediate designation of the hand of God, the conqueror only succeeds to all the
painful duties and subordination to the power of God which belonged to the sovereign that
held the country before.” 89
Ten years after Hastings’ acquittal, in 1805, Wellesley was recalled back to Britain.
This was caused by two factors, first Dundas left the Board of Directors in 1801. As a result
Wellesley lost the support of board when it came to further wars. Second, the Second
Anglo-Maratha War had taken a turn for the worse. 90 Wellesley’s order to return back to
Britain caused John Malcolm make a stunning claim in defense of Wellesley record of
expansion:
It was a true statement which the great Lord Clive applied to the progress of the
British Empire in India - ‘To stop is dangerous; to recede ruin.’ And if we do
recede, either from our right pretentions and claims- nay, if we look as if we
thought of receding- we shall have a host of enemies, and thousands who dare not
harbour (sic) a thought of opposing the irresistible tide of our success, will hasten
to attack a nation which shows by diffidence in its own power that it anticipates
its downfall. 91
This statement shows the transformation of how Britain viewed its Empire. In only ten
years after Hastings’s trial the attitude toward empire changed dramatically. The view had
initially viewed further expansion negatively, but in the last years of the eighteenth-century
expansion started to be viewed as positive because of its perceived necessity. Malcolm’s
statement is an example of the need for more expansion. What Malcolm essentially said
in his speech is that the maintenance of the empire required further conquests, and that if
conquest were to stop then the British Empire would end as a result.
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***
The Fourth Anglo-Mysore War was the penultimate event in first phase of the
British Empire in India. The first phase started with the granting of the charter for the
Company in 1601. 92 The beginning phase concluded in 1818 with the defeat of the Maratha
Empire, which resulted in the Company domination of the subcontinent. The second phase
lasted from 1818 until the decolonization and partition of India in 1947. Throughout the
first phase the Company was focused on trade and was hesitant to conquer regions in India.
This mercantile focus was first subjugated to a geopolitical one in the mid-eighteenth
century, when more ambitious Governor-Generals led the Company. With Robert Clive’s
victory at Plassey on 1757, the Company controlled the rich region of Bengal. After Clive,
Warren Hastings consolidated Company rule in that region but did expand beyond it.
Cornwallis resisted expanding the Company and instead focused on the maintenance of the
territory that it held. 93 These leaders ushered in an era of territorial expansion that lasted
until the end of the Empire.
Richard Wellesley’s career in India proved that territorial expansion was necessary
for the maintenance of the British Empire. During the seven years Wellesley spent in India,
he presided over the conquest of numerous regions, and brought others under control
through subsidiary alliances. 94 This continuous expansion continued well beyond his
career. Mysore was one of these regions that transitioned from being an enemy of the
British, to being a subject.
Wellesley also represented the shift the Company went through, from a trading
power to an imperial one. Wellesley’s actions proved the importance of geopolitical
factors, and that they would be given priority over economic ones. Wellesley’s apparent
disregard for the debts that the Company incurred in order to fuel his wars of expansion
proved the primacy of geopolitical factors. Another example of the importance of
geopolitical factors is how Richard Wellesley utilized the French threat in India to engage
in an offensive war against Tipu Sultan.
Wellesley was able to use the fear of France because of the long running AngloFrance rivalry. 95 Wellesley exaggerated the severity of the danger that the French invasion
and subsequent occupation of Egypt posed to Britain’s empire in India. Wellesley also was
given a great tool that further helped him when he overstated the French threat, the Malartic
Proclamation. The proclamation showed France’s intent to meddle in India via Mughal
successor states. However, the document only showed France’s weak willed desires to aid
Tipu, it lacked concrete plans to. Ultimately the proclamation did not lead to a FrancoMysore alliance; instead it made Tipu a causality of Great Britain and France’s geopolitical
struggle.
Furthermore, Wellesley’s time in India demonstrated a shift of how Britain viewed
its empire. Starting in the middle of the eighteenth century the British viewed their empire
with reluctance. Some parliamentarians argued that the Empire was supposed to be
responsible for spreading rule of law and taking care of its subjects. 96 When Robert Clive
92

East India Company, The Register of Letters & C of the Governour and Company of Merchants of
London Trading into the East Indies, 158-159.
93 Lawson, The East India Company: A History, 91.
94 Severn, Architects of Empire: The Duke of Wellington and His Brothers, 68&192.
95 Israel, “The Emerging Empire: The Continental Perspective, 1650-1713,” 441.
96 Carter, “Edmund Burke on the Impeachment of Warren Hastings, 15-19 February 1788,” 153.

and Warren Hastings returned to Britain after their time in India they were criticized by
Parliament. Both men had impeachment trials held against them but were acquitted. 97 The
opposite occurred with Wellesley, immediately after the capture of Seringapatam,
Parliament praised him and the East India Company. 98 Wellesley continued the
expansionist policies of Clive and Hastings, but the view of empire had changed. Now
empire and the expansion of it were seen as necessary.
Ultimately during the period in question, Wellesley’s “imperial vision” transformed
the Company from a trading company into an imperial power. 99 When the Company lost
control of India in the aftermath of the Great Mutiny in 1857, the state maintained this
vision. But this imperial vision also exposed a major problem that plagued the British
Empire until its end. This problem was that in order to keep the empire functioning and
intact, the British would have to continuously engage in military conflicts. These military
conflicts included both wars of expansion and of protection. 100 Eighty years after the end
of the Fourth Anglo-Mysore war, in 1879, Queen Victoria took notice of the state of
perpetual warfare. Victoria warned that, “If we are to maintain our position as a first-rate
power we must be prepared for attacks and wars, somewhere or other, continually.” 101
In conclusion, Richard Wellesley’s career in India showcased two major changes
in how empire was viewed by Britain. After Wellesley’s career the expansion of British
territory via warfare was seen as a positive, but only as long as the British won the wars.
Furthermore, when the centuries old Anglo-French rivalry flared again up during the
French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic Wars, it too altered the view of empire.
From now on empire was seen as the best way to ensure peace and prosperity. 102 These
two factors reverberated throughout Pax Britannica, and shaped much of the modern world.
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